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SHIFTS AND ZMPLICATIONS OF FEDERALISM POR CIVIL RIGHTS 
By J. Clay Smith, Jr.l 
In United State v. Loper the Court determined that a federal 
statute, the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which makes it a 
federal crime for any individual knowingly to possess firearms 
within a school zone, exceeded the powers of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause. While on its face this case may not appear to have 
relevance to civil rights, the present anti-government environment 
does not permit me to rest on an assumption that segments 
attempting to undermine civil rights laws will not at some point 
challenge the power of Congress to limit regulation in the area of 
civil rights. 
Before addressing the issues raised in Lopez, I wish to muse 
about three important civil rights cases just to stretch our minds 
to the negative or positive potential of Lopez. 
Jim Crow Era: The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 
In 1875, during the Reconstruction era, Congress passed a 
public accommodations law which broadly proscribed discrimination 
in "inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other 
places of public amusement. n For the first time in American history 
. v 
! 
1 Comments before The Law Professor Section's Seminar on 
" Substantive Review of Recent u. S. Supreme Court Decisions, It during 
the National Bar Association's 70th Annual Meeting during held at 
the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Baltimore, Md., August 3, 1995. Professor 
Smith is a Professor at Howard University School of Law and is 
Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center for the 1995-
1996 academic year. 
2 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). 
; . 
Black Americans believed that Congress had helped to advance 
equality in the area of public accommodations. They were right. But 
in 1883, shortly after the federal troops were withdrawn from the 
South and the collapse of the Reconstruction era was ongoing, the 
u.S. Supreme Court, in deciding The Civil Rights Cases, determined 
that the Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because the it failed to 
limit the categories of affected businesses to those impinging upon 
interstate commerce. 3 
While Black people in the South and North did not fully 
understand the jurisprudential basis of this decision, they 
understood that white businesses could, on the basis of race, 
exclude them from their inns, segregate them in their public 
conveyances on land and water; exclude them from or segregate them 
in their theaters and other places of amusement. Black Americans 
understood racial discrimination at will to be within the allowance 
of traditional governmental functions, popularly referred to as 
states' rights. 
Black lawyers knew what had happened. 4 They knew that the U. S. 
Supreme Court had emboldened the principle of states' rights in the 
law against the equality of Black people in the country. Black 
lawyers and their allies knew full well that while government could 
not make Black people equal in the eyes of white people, its 
: \I 
3 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
4 J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-
1944, at 221-222 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 
1993), where II [Richard] Greener [a Black graduate of the University 
of South Carolina's law school] called the court's decision 'the 
most startling decision. since [Dred Scott] .'11 Id. at 222. 
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actions and inactions could re-enslave them. Today, the notion of 
states' rights fall under a category that some scholars refer to as 
federal-based limits. 
Federal-based limits is analogous to a separation of powers 
principle. Of course, we are well aware of the separation of 
powers principle applicable to the national government that checks 
the powers of the coordinate branches of government. The purpose of 
the doctrine is to limit the power of any branch of government so 
that no single branch is superior to the other, and to protect 
against tyranny. Over the years, political operatives, political 
pundits, law and political science scholars, lawyers, and court 
watchers have argued about and written volumes of books about 
horizontal separation of powers, and their concerns about and 
definition of tyranny. And so it is also with federal-based limits, 
which encompasses the vertical powers reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment, the enumerated powers vested in Congress under 
the Commerce Clause and incidental powers of the national 
government expressed or implied in other provisions of the 
Constitution. 
After the u.s. Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, unless state laws were passed to protect Black people from 
racial discrimination by private concerns, it has been said that 
I \J 
the Congress by its silence to pass such laws, condoned affirmative 
acts of discrimination. 5 
5 See Hall v. DeCUir, 95 U.S. 485, 498 (1877) (Clifford, J., 
concurring, discussed in J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and 
Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1077, 1098-
3 
The Heart of Atlanta Motel & Katzenback Motel Decisions 
Between 1883 and 1964, some local state governments did pass 
civil rights laws prohibiting various forms of discrimination, 6 but 
many of these laws were not comprehensive in coverage. Many of 
these laws were prohibitory in nature with no corrective 
provisions, and with no state agencies dedicated solely to the 
enforcement of these laws. The civil rights movement of the 1960s 
and the recognition by the business community and Congress that 
segregation in the South was an obstruction to American enterprise 
and morally wrong, passed Title II, Sec. 201 (a), of the civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which provides: 
All persons shall be entitled to full and equal 
employment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, 
without discrimination, segregation on the ground of 
race, color, religion, or national origin. 
Section 201(b) of Title II establishes four classes of business 
establishments, each of which "serves the public ll and nis a place 
of public accommodation n within the meaning of Sec. 201 (a) "if its 
operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by 
99 (1994). 
6 For example, in 1886, three years after the Court struck 
down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a black lawyer named John W.E. 
Thomas, who was a member of the Illinois General Assembly, 
introduced, and the legislature adopted, a civil righ~s law with 
some of the provisions contained in the civil Rights Act of 1875. 
EMANCIPATION, supra note 4, at 372-73. 
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it is supported by State action. II Under the Act, Title II includes 
four categories termed as lIestablishments ll ; namely, 
any inn, motel, or other establishment which provides 
lodging to transient guest, other than an establishment 
located within a building which contains not more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually 
occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his 
residence .... 
Finally, 201{c) defines the phrase "affect commerce" as applied to 
the above establishments declaring that lIany inn, hotel, motel, or 
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guest 
"affects commerce per se." 
In 1964, the u.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Title II in two major cases: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.,' 
and Ka tzenbach v. McClung. 8 The core underpinnings of the Court' s 
determination in these cases is that Congress has the power to 
legislate against moral and social wrongs, and that discrimination 
in accommodations on account of race, color, religion or national 
origin under Title II is well within the powers of Congress. The 
Court determined that even without specific findings by Congress, 
its proceedings were sufficient to demonstrate that racism was a 
moral and social wrong9 coupled with its nthe disruptive effect 
t 
, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
8 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
-
9 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 257. 
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that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. 1110 
In Katzenbach, the Court upheld Title II on a challenge by 
Appellees claiming that the Act could not be sustained in the 
absence of findings by Congress. The Court determined that the 
absence of findings was of no consequence in the face of "an 
impressive array of testimony that discrimination in restaurants 
had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel 
by Negroes. 1111 The Court opined that the aggregate affect of 
discrimination had a direct impact on interstate commerce without 
the need for particular findings per enterprise. 12 
Federal-based Implications oE Lopez 
Back to Lopez. 
What was Congress attempting to achieve when it passed the 
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990? It was simply attempting to keep 
guns away from public schools and to demonstrate the extent to 
which intra-state fatalities of our young due to violence has a 
direct or indirect -impact on commerce, indeed; the future of our 
nation.13 Was the purpose and intent of the legislation 
appropriately grounded in the powers of Congress? A majority of 
10 Id. The Court further opined that nthe power of Congress to 
promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the 
local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the 
States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial 
and harmful effect upon~that commerce. U Id. at 258. 
11 Katzenbach, 379 U. S. 300. 
12 Id. at 301, citing Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U.S. 
643, 648 (1944). 
13 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1651 (Justice Stevens, dissenting), Id. 
(Justice Souter, dissenting), 1657 (Justice Breyer, dissenting) . 
6 
) 
the Court held that the operative provision (sec. 922(q»14 could 
not be justified because firearms possession within a local school 
zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Hence, sec. 
922 (q) of the Gun-Free School Act of 1990 was held to exceed 
authorized federal-based limits. Stated differently, the Act 
stepped on states' rights to regulate crime relevant to public 
schools. 
As I see it, Lopez is part of an ongoing political and 
judicial debate on how much power the Congress has to regulate 
American life. A current sub-set of that inquiry is' the extent to 
which Congress will exercise its legitimate power to regulate in 
the field of civil rights. Presently, affirmative action is at the 
core of this debate. 1s While affirmative action is not directly the 
subject of my talk, it is the match that is being used to ignite 
and spread the fire of intolerance to other civil rights fields. 
My concern reaches back to The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 (and 
Hall v. DeCuir (1877») 16 where the U. S. Supreme Court held that 
civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in public 
accommodation was unconstitutional. 17 Today, a legitimate question 
is whether current civil rights laws are within the sight of fire 
14 Id. (passim). 
~I 
15 Kevin Merida, Doie Aims at Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, 
July 28, 1995, at A10; Louis Harris, Affirmative Action and the 
Voter, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995,. at A13; Benjamin Wittes, An 
Affirmative Action Parable, WASH. LE~ TIMES, July 24, 1995, at 1. 
16 See Justice and Jurisprudence, supra note 5. 
17 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 
7 
) 
of a Court tilting fast to the far right and once again trapping 
Black people between cases like The Civil Rights Cases and 
DeCuir?18 
Federal-based Limits: The Next Century 
In the next century, could the Court declare that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting, inter alia, racial discrimination 
in employment, housing, public accommodations, places of public 
amusement is beyond the reach of federal power? Could federal-based 
limits be turned against Black people, and others presently 
protected under the protection of the Civil Rights Act of 19~4? 
The Lopez decision does not immediately answer any of these 
questions. Some might even say that a general reading of Lopez 
makes my questions appear preposterous. If Lopez is a general 
concern about the limits of government, why do Justices O'Connor 
and Kennedy in their concurring opinions rightly assure us that two 
key civil rights decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
are II authorities . wi thin the fair ambit of the Court's 
practical conception of commercial regulation [that] are not called 
in question by our decision today. 1119 
I agree with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. In fact, I am 
elated by the astute message that these two justices communicated 
to the civil rights community and to those whose aim is to 
, t 
dismantle federal power'to regulate in civil rights areas covered 
by Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, etc. What 
18 Justice and Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 1099. 
19 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637 (emphasis added) . 
8 
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concerns me is what civil rights cases or laws may be called into 
question, if any? 
With the possible exceptions of Justice O'Connor and Kennedy 
(and the four justices in dissent) ,20 I cannot bring myself to 
believe that the aim of C.J. Rehnquist is isolated to the facts of 
Lopez, though, hopefully, my belief may ultimately prove to be 
misplaced. I believe that Lopez may give rise to a jurisprudential 
thrust that could deconstruct the power of Congress to regulate 
nsubject matter activityll in the field of civil rights, and I 
believe that both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are not only aware 
of this possibility, but could be concerned about it. 
I'd like to press my case further: Just note the list of cases 
that Justice Rehnquist cites in Lopez following this statement: 
"But even ... modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject 
to outer limits [and that] the Court has heeded that warning and 
undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for 
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected 
interstate commerce. 1121 Note also the supporting footnote to the 
prior quote which says, II [S] imply because Congress may conclude 
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it SO.1I22 Incidentally, both 
20 Supra note 13. 
21 Lopez, 115·· S. Ct. 1628-29. 
22 Id. at 1629, n.2, also citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981). 
9 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach are listed among the four 
cases connected with the footnote. 
What is the point? Does the quoted text (in Lopez) mean that 
the per se determination by Congress that any "inn, hotel, motel, 
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guest 
affects commerce per se" as determined in Heart of Atlanta Motel is 
now under a cloud? I believe that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy 
have adequately answered this question in the negative, thereby 
sealing for now a solid majority to uphold Heart of Atlanta Motel 
and Katzenbach. 23 
My instincts cause me to be more than casually concerned about 
C. J. Rehnquist' s preoccupation with Justice Black's concurring 
opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel, cited in footnote 2 of the 
majority opinion, which states, "[W]hether particular operations 
affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the 
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a 
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled 
finally only by this Court. ,,24 
Query, after Lopez, absent findings or with them, how much of 
a record is enough of a record to sustain an action of Congress 
23 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637. Further, the holding- of the Court in 
Katzenbach firmly suppqnts the continued validity of Heart of 
Atlanta Motel. There Justice Clark stated, "We think in so doing 
that Congress acted well within its powers to protect and foster 
commerce in extending the coverage of Title II only to those 
restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or serving food, 
a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce." 
Katzenback, 379 U.S. 304. . 
24 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1629, n.2 (emphasis. added) . 
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under the Commerce Clause? It is my opinion that in Lopez C.J. 
Rehnquist, whether purposely or inadvertently, has placed within 
the sights for judicial deconstruction the broad reach of acts of 
Congress in the field of civil rights and other social legislation 
that aid exceptionally affected groups, such as Black people, and 
the general population. 
In exploring the quantum of such an inquiry, is the Court 
acting under the guise of "judgement" 1 or "will?U 2s will we now see 
the development of standards or weights of congressional 
proceedings emerge under civil rights legislation similar to the 
federal rules of evidence and procedure? Will more actions of 
Congress now be challenged? Will the prudential components now be 
further relaxed26 allowing greater access to the courts to bring 
actions against laws passed by Congress? Will the potential reach 
of Lopez create in practice the supremacy of the states over the 
national government? 
Is there a positive side to Lopez? Will civil rights groups 
take advantage of the liberal standing allotment in Adarand v. 
Pe:iia,27 to challenge acts of Congress that either transfer too much 
authority to the states or private concerns, perhaps, arguing that 
excessive grants of power to the states or allowing agencies to 
transfer public power to private concerns is violative of federal-
2S See Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 19 
(1991 edition). 
26 See Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104 (1995). 
. . --:,-
-
27 Id. 
11 
based limits imposed by the Commerce Clause or violative of the 
nondelegation doctrine, respectively? I wonder how the federal 
judiciary will resolve these questions. 
I also note that nowhere in Justice Thomas's concurring 
opinion does he mention any civil rights cases or make mention of 
the concurring statement of Justices 0' Connor and Kennedy that 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach decisions are "within the 
fair ambit of. . commercial regulation and are not called in 
question by [Lopez]-.;_'~28 
Squeals of Terror 
A "squeal of terror went up in some quarters" 29 when Lopez was 
announced by the Court. Some quarters argue that based on the facts 
of Lopez, the "squeals" raise a false alarm. I remind you that 
attempts were made to divert the attention of the Black community 
from similarly "squeals of terror" when the Court began to whittle 
away at the civil rights laws passed during the Reconstruction 
era. 30 Were these squeals misplaced? 
The civil rights community and people of good will, who 
believe in fairness, and abhor harm that could befall Black people 
in this country must not be mislead or misdirected about the 
reaches of Lopez under the control of what appears to be a decision 
28 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637. 
29 Federalism'S Future, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at A20. 
30 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO 
AMERIONS 297-343 (Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y.: 1970). See generally ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Harper & 
RoW, Publishers~ N.Y.: 1988). . 
· -. 1 -. 
that invites a reexamination of the limits of federal-based power 
and so-called application of rules of original understanding31 
using formalism as the Court's tool of decisionmaking. 
31 L 115 S Ct 1644, n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). opez, .. 
13 
